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Introduction
Guatemala has been sucked into a cycle of civil unrest, poverty and mass migration. How
did this happen? In order to understand the issues Guatemalans face today, a historical analysis
of Guatemala’s relationship with the U.S. is needed. Guatemala has had a long and tumultuous
history of U.S. intervention within its borders. This essay will examine the role of the 1954 CIA
coup and the United Fruit Company in fostering the Guatemalan Civil War and the implications
of that war for ongoing crime and instability in the country today. Some of the most pressing
issues Guatemalans face today are high migration rates, femicide, and human trafficking.
Guatemalan migration is on the rise; from October 1st, 2017 to August 31st, the U.S. government
arrested 42,757 Guatemalans who attempted to immigrate to the U.S. with their families. This is
the highest number of migrant families from a single country that U.S immigration has seen.
(Yates-Doerr, 2018). According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2019 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Guatemala is currently a Tier 2 country for human trafficking. Guatemala does not meet
the standards for eliminating trafficking, but is making an effort. According to UNICEF, there are
nearly 48,500 victims of sex trafficking in Guatemala, creating illegal profits equivalent to 2.7%
of the Gross Domestic Product (Velásquez Gómez & Skoog, 2016). Why is this?
In 1954, a CIA supported military coup was launched against democratically elected
Colonel Jacobo Arbenz bringing rise to the 36 year Civil War from 1960-1996 in which over
200,000 lives were taken and over 45,000 missing (Ewing, 2018). The Civil War ended with the
1996 Guatemala Peace Treaties and a hope for a better future for the country, but unfortunately
that was not the case. Instead, there was a surge in criminal violence and a weakening of
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democratic institutions, leading to a situation in which Guatemala was unable to respond to the
multiple threats attacking its democracy. Human trafficking was able to flourish and migration to
the U.S. rose tremendously. In this paper, I trace the implications of U.S. intervention in
Guatemala and the effects it had on their security and stability, taking trafficking, current day
femicide and a rise in immigration as an example of the types of unintended consequences that
can emerge when foreign intervention creates civil unrest. In this essay, I argue that the role of
U.S. intervention through the United Fruit Company’s vast involvement in Guatemala and the
CIA backed 1954 coup are key causal factors for the Guatemalan Civil War, which has now led
to an environment conducive for the normalization of gender based violence and human
trafficking. This in turn, has resulted in high rates of Guatemalans migrating to the U.S. border
where they are being met with racist anti-immigrant rhetoric. In order to understand why so
many Guatemalans are fleeing their country, an analysis of their history and the role the U.S.
played in it is essential. The US role in the 1954 coup placed Guatemala on a trajectory of civil
conflict that the country is still affected by today.
History of UFCO Involvement in Guatemala
According to Dosal (1993), for forty years the United Fruit Company (UFCO) controlled
Guatemala’s railroads, wharves, shipping and telegraphs. The government also delegated control
of their two leading exports, coffee and bananas, to UFCO. The U.S. government was very
involved in this process. The U.S. urged the Guatemalan government to adopt policies American
enterprises would find favorable and helped UFCO during their contractual negotiations (Dosal,
1993). This occurred despite skepticism from the Departments of State and Justice regarding
UFCO’s monopoly power. UFCO became known as “el pulpo” octopus in Spanish, due to its
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extensive control of more than just their banana plantations (Dosal, 1993). Schlesinger and
Kinzer argue that UFCO was essentially a state within a state due to its ownership of
Guatemala’s telephone and telegraph facilities, its administration of its Atlantic harbor and
monopolization of its banana export. Also, UFCO’s subsidiary company, International Railways
of Central America (IRCA) owned 887 miles of railroad tracks in Guatemala, which equated to
nearly the whole entire country (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.12).
UFCO workers did enjoy better working conditions than most farm laborers in
Guatemala; they were provided with adequate housing, medical facilities and a school for
employees’ children. But, many of the American overseers of the company were blatantly racist.
UFCO policy required “all persons of color to give right of way to whites and remove their hats
while talking to them” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005 p.71). Also, UFCO did not allow for any
organized labor unions among its employees. During the years of the Ubico dictatorship,
peasants that were performing forced labor for plantation owners were at least given their own
small plots of land, but UFCO rejected this idea. Cole Blasier, an American historian, argues that
for many Guatemalans, UFCO represented the United States. UFCO was responsible for bribing
politicians, pressuring governments and intimidating opponents. For Guatemalans, they felt as if
their country was “being mercilessly exploited by foreign interests which took huge profits
without making any significant contributions to the nation’s welfare” (Schlesinger and Kinzer,
2005, p. 73).
UFCO was very well connected to the Eisenhower administration. The Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles had his New York law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell representing UFCO.
Allen Dulles, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) served on UFCO’s board of
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trustees and owned shares of the company (Bryjak, 2017). Ed Whitman was the company’s top
public relations officer and husband of Ann Whitman, Eisenhower’s private secretary. Whitman
made a film, Why the Kremlin Hates Bananas, presenting UFCO as being on the front lines of
the fight against communism (Koeppel, 2008). UFCO then began to pay for journalists to travel
to Guatemala to learn their side of the story. The U.S. press began to print stories about mass
arrests and tortures committed by the Arbenz regime. On the 15th of June, John Foster Dulles
declared that “Guatemalans were living under a Communist type reign of terror” which was
untrue (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p. 11). One of the main issues fueling these false accounts
of the situation in Guatemala were the land reforms enforced by democratically elected
Guatemalan president, Jacobo Arbenz.
Before Arbenz was elected, UFCO essentially was playing puppet master with 1931-1944
Guatemalan dictator Jorge Ubico, guiding him into allowing them to own or lease three million
acres of land and operate fifteen hundred miles of railroad. UFCO worked very closely with the
Ubico dictatorship and exploited the Guatemalan people. Ubico passed harsh vagrancy laws
which forced indigenous people who did not own land to work for local landowners 100 days a
year. Ubico also made it legal for landowners to “murder stubborn or rebellious
Indians” (Bucheli, 2008). Ubico was considered to be a very strong ally to the U.S. and
especially UFCO. He was taken down by a pro-democracy uprising amongst striking
schoolteachers and was replaced in 1945 by Juan Jose Arevalo, an exiled college professor keen
on social reform. He only imposed a small amount of regulatory measures against UFCO, yet the
army still attempted almost thirty coups during his six years in office due to his “reformist”
agenda (Fisher, 2012). Jacobo Arbenz was then democratically elected in 1951.
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From the very beginning Arbenz made clear that once elected he would prioritize
building a highway to the Atlantic to “end the IRCA/United Fruit stranglehold on the nation’s
foreign trade” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.74). He also planned on building a new electric
power plant in order to end reliance on the American owned facility given that it was the only
major generating outlet within the country. Arbenz was an advocate of agrarian reform and
believed that unequal land distribution was one of the leading causes hindering economic
development (Dosal, 1993). His program expropriated 209,842 acres of uncultivated land,
mainly belonging to UFCO, to poor laborers. UFCO wanted nearly $16 million for the land, but
Guatemala offered UFCO’s declared valuation for tax purposes of $627,572. UFCO undervalued
the property in order to reduce its tax liability (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). Clearly, this was
infuriating for UFCO who controlled nearly 40,000 jobs in Guatemala and had investments in
the country valued at $60 million. On April 20, 1954, a complaint was delivered to Guatemalan
authorities by the U.S. State Department demanding just evaluation for the land equating to
nearly $16 million. They based their claim on international law that requires fair compensation
for land that is seized by foreigners, despite domestic law (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). In
response, Arbenz continued his plans for agrarian reform and expropriated more uncultivated
UFCO land bringing the total to 386,901 acres. They offered $500,000 for the newest land they
had redistributed (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). During this time negotiations between
Guatemalan officials and the State Department were occuring, but Arbenz already sensed what
was going to occur. In his annual message to Congress in March 1954 he stated:
The essential character of the international situation with relation to Guatemala is that, as
a consequence of the agrarian reform and the economic and social development of the
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country, we face a growing threat of foregin intervention in the internal affairs of
Guatemala, placing in danger the stability of our constitutional life and the integrity of
our national independence (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.77).
At that moment, UFCO was indeed planning a way in which to convince the American
government that Arbenz was a communist and a threat to freedom. They hired influential
lobbyists and publicists in order to create a climate in the U.S. that feared Arbenz and favored his
overthrow.
The 1954 Coup- Operation Success
According to unclassified CIA documents, elites in Guatemala persuaded U.S. journalists
and members of Congress that the Guatemalan government was moving further toward
Communism (Barrett, 2011). Many of those elites were a part of UFCO. Barret argues that the
U.S. feared that Arbenz was a Communist threat and used the CIA to overthrow him in the 1954
coup also known as “Operation Success.” After the coup, there was no serious evidence that
could tie Guatemala to the Soviets (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). What the majority of
journalists latched onto to support the claim that Arbenz was a communist was his land reform
plan. They warned that Communists would “use the program as a stepping stone to take over
Guatemala” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.107). Also, multiple U.S. Congressmen argued the
program was similar to the nationalization of oil companies in Iran, even though both of these
programs were done legally under local law (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005).
A significant part of the overthrow of the Arbenz government was psychological warfare.
Through multiple raids, small scale attacks and anti-Arbenz journalists, the U.S. worked to
persuade Guatemala’s citizens and political/military leaders that a large scale invasion was going
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to occur in order to unnerve Arbenz and others. Through this strategy, the government collapsed
without much of a struggle (Barret, 2011). After the coup, Arbenz’s reforms were nullified,
bringing peace of mind back to UFCO and the U.S. With CIA assistance, President Castillo
Armas came into power with his anti Communist, yet dictatorial government agenda. U.S.
officials believed that if they could turn Guatemala into a “showcase for democracy” it would be
the best defense against communism (Brockett, 2010). But, at the same time, the U.S. pretended
they had nothing to do with the coup as cries for a return to democracy in Guatemala began
under the Castillo Armas authoritarian regime. Despite this, the overthrow became known as one
of the CIA's well-known successes and the U.S. continued its support of Castillo Armas.
Brockett emphasizes that many of the leading scholars regarding the United States and Central
America relationship argue that material and security interests were linked in the 1954 coup. The
United States has always wanted to “control” or “dominate” the region (Brockett, 2010). The
CIA took their success in Guatemala and used it as an example of what could be done in
operations against Sukarno in Indonesia and Castro in Cuba (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005).
As a result of the coup, UFCO essentially disintegrated. The Justice Department had filed
an antitrust suit threatening UFCOs operations in Guatemala. UFCO ended up having to
surrender some of its trade to local companies and the majority of its land to local businessmen.
It also had to give up ownership interest of IRCA. But, in 1972 they sold all remaining land
holdings in Guatemala to the Del Monte corporation, which also has a dark history within
Guatemala.
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Brief History of the 36 year long Civil War
In the years before the start of the war, the military gained tremendous political control,
especially with the passing of the 1944 Constitution. The Constitution granted the military the
responsibility of protecting democracy, and “gave it the ability to intervene in matters related to
rights and freedoms” (Ewing, 2018). The army was able to use this constitutional mandate with
support from the CIA during the 1954 coup. After the removal of Arbenz, many military leaders
succeeded as president. They demolished the agrarian reforms and left the Guatemalan farmers
with little to nothing to survive. Divisions began to form between military groups with a rise in
assassinations and attempts to remove the president. Many former soldiers turned to support
from banana workers and farmers who opposed the military government and supported Arbenz.
A multitude of rebel groups began to form the leftist guerrilla front that fought the State. In 1960,
a group of armed insurgents known as Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)
started an unsuccessful uprising against the Guatemalan government, sparking the beginning of
the civil war (COHA, 2011). For many years after, URNG continued to fight against the
repression and human rights abuses committed by the various military dictators that ruled
Guatemala. The army counteracted by exerting its power over every community in Guatemala
through creating an intelligence program that included mobile military police, paramilitary death
squads and sophisticated torture techniques (Ewing, 2018). Since the guerrillas were mainly
located in rural communities, it was incredibly hard to tell the difference between civilians and
guerrillas, leading to mass amounts of civilian deaths. As the military continued to infiltrate rural
villages, the government became removed of civilians and was almost made up of entirely
military members.
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According to declassified intelligence documents, during the 1960s, the U.S. was highly
involved in the training and equipping of Guatemalan security forces that were responsible for
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people during the Civil War. Bracken argues that the
worst period was when President Rios Montt, a man that was trained at the United States Army
School of the Americas in the Panama Canal Zone, came to power through a coup, with the
support of the CIA. His goal was to “drain the sea” of the guerrilla movement and eradicate
civilian support (Bracken, 2016). During his term, Montt led what is known as “Scorched Earth”
in which more than 70,000 people died and went missing. He specifically targeted indigenous
Maya communities, attacking 626 villages and tried to exterminate the Ixil ethnic group, a
Mayan Indian community. According to Farah, the CIA was aware of the mass killings of Indian
villagers. He massacred children and the elderly, people who could not have been guerrillas, it
was genocidal. Bracken points out that in 1977, Jimmy Carter tried to pressure Guatemala to stop
the abuses by banning the sale of military weapons to Guatemala. Ronald Reagan became
president and all the efforts of Carter were reversed. Bracken argues that Reagan befriended
Montt believing he was committed to democracy and reform. He provided financial support and
military advising, and lifted the U.S. embargo (Bracken, 2016). Reagan met with Rios Montt in
Honduras in 1982, stating he was “a man of great integrity” and “totally dedicated to democracy”
and that he knew Montt “wants to improve the quality of life for all Guatemalans and to promote
justice” (Grandin, 2013 and Kinzer, 2018). He promised that his administration would do all they
could to support his “progressive efforts” (Kinzer, 2018). Only 10 days before this meeting, a
declassified U.S. document shows that the State Department was informed of a substantiated
allegation of “a large-scale killing of Indian men, women and children in a remote area by the
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Guatemalan army” (Grandin, 2013). According to Grandin, there are other classified documents
that expose that the White House was not concerned about the massacres as much as they were
concerned about “countering the bad publicity” (Grandin, 2013). In a declassified Department of
State document, State officials are discussing that if President Lucas “can go it alone in his
policy of repression, there is no need for the U.S. to provide the GOG with redundant political
and military support” because “The provisioning of such assistance would needlessly render us a
complicit party in the repression” (Grandin, 2013). The U.S. knew exactly what was occurring in
the Guatemalan civil war and instead of intervening to help avoid the genocide, the U.S. stood
idly by. After Reagan’s endorsement of Montt, Guatemalan soldiers went to the village of Dos
Erres and slaughtered at least 162 people over three days (Grandin, 2013). With U.S. support,
Montt continued attacking indigenous communities, creating instability and risk for
Guatemalans. A declassified 1966 memo from a U.S. State Department security official showed
that the U.S. even set up safe houses in the presidential palace to be used by Guatemalan security
agents and U.S. contacts, “the safe house became headquarters for Guatemala’s ‘dirty way’
against leftitst insurgency and suspected allies'' (Farah, 1999). During the Cold War in the 1960s
and 70s, the U.S. even gave the Guatemalan military $33 million in aid, despite being aware of
the terrible track record they held on human rights (Farah, 1999). According to a 1994 Defense
Intelligence Agency report, in the 1980s as the U.S. continued to provide financial aid to
Guatemalan military intelligence, they were dumping suspected guerrillas (dead and alive) out of
airplanes into the ocean. This was a way for them to remove the evidence that prisoners had been
tortured and killed (Farah, 1999).
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U.S. Involvement Pre and During the Guatemalan Civil War
According to Barret, during the late Cold War period, the 1954 overthrow came to be
seen as shameful. It damaged American interests in Latin America and “strengthened deep-seated
anti-Americanism throughout the continent” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.229). The
governments following the overthrow of Arbenz were far more violent, repressive and damaging
to Guatemala as a whole. With the help of the U.S. Castillo Armas took power after the coup.
Despite the U.S. refusing to provide any aid to Guatemala during the Arévalo and Arbenz
administrations, they provided the Armas administration with $80 million in the first three years
after the coup (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). According to Schlesinger and Kinzer, these funds
revitalized some areas of the private sector, but did close to nothing for the nation's poor. Armas
wanted to return the country’s economy to the old days of relying on the coffee and banana crop.
He was able to drive “all but one half of one percent of the peasants who had won plots under the
Arbenz agrarian reform off their new land” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.229). Even though
many of these poor farmers were able to improve their lives exponentially due to the Arbenz land
reforms, their newfound success was stripped away from them. Additionally, Armas was antiunion and focused on press censorship. In 1955, he postponed the following year's scheduled
presidential election and instead only held congressional elections in which he solely permitted
candidates of his own party, the National Liberation Movement to run (Schlesinger and Kinzer,
2005). According to Schlesinger and Kinzer, Castillo Armas had the “unswerving support of the
American government” (p.233).
The Eisenhower administration had a Cold War focused agenda of making Guatemala an
example of democracy. After visiting Guatemala, Vice-President Nixon claimed that this was the
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first instance in history that a free government was replacing a Communist one, and that the
world was watching to see who could do a better job. Despite the aid provided by the U.S. the
situation in Guatemala worsened. According to Schlesinger and Kinzer, many Guatemalan
officials of this new regime “considered Castillo Armas’ victory a license to steal
money” (p.234). Distrust in the government resulted in plots against the administration occurring
almost weekly. Eventually, Armas was assassinated, though no one knows who exactly did it.
After the death of Armas, the U.S. provided $97,00 in “campaign funds” to José Luis Cruz
Salazar in order to keep Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes from becoming the next president (Schlesinger
and Kinzer, 2005). Ydígoras at the time was the ambassador to Colombia. He won the election,
but the official electoral tribunal announced Ortiz Passarelli as the winner. As a result, Ydígoras’
followers flooded the streets in protest, newspapers “denounced the fraud” and Ydígoras himself
threatened to stage a coup (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). Following the election announcement,
Ydígoras was called to a meeting at the National Palace in which the American Embassy
guaranteed U.S. approval for a settlement. If Ydígoras won the next election, it would be
recognized. Despite the U.S. funding his opponent, he eventually won the 1958 election and held
office for six years. At first the people were supportive of Ydígoras, but then the U.S. approached
him for a favor. In the eyes of the U.S. government, Ydígoras owed the U.S. a favor because of
the National Palace meeting in which they ensured recognition of his presidential candidacy. The
U.S. was planning an invasion of Cuba in order to overthrow Fidel Castro and needed Guatemala
to provide them with a base of operations. Ydígoras agreed to cooperate with the U.S. in return
for firm U.S. backing in Guatemala. The presence of the CIA in Guatemala training Cuban exiles
to overthrow Castro became public knowledge and upset many Guatemalans. According to
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Schlesinger and Kinzer, for the many officers in Guatemala that were schooled with a strong
nationalist framework, this situation was humiliating and infuriating. A growing divide began to
form within Guatemala. On November 13th, 1960 half of the Guatemalan Army staged an
uprising at Fort Matamoros in Guatemala and seized it (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). An
additional group took control of Puerto Barrios on the Atlantic and the barracks of Zacapa
(Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). Due to the fear that a coup could occur in which the Bay of Pigs
operation would be sidelined, the U.S. helped Ydígoras stop the revolt. They sent several CIA
B-26 bombers which were piloted by Cuban exiles to attack the rebels. President Eisenhower
sent five U.S. Navy vessels to patrol off Guatemala’s coast (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). Due
to the strong military response from the U.S. the revolt was crushed. Guatemalans not working
with the U.S. began to see the Guatemalan government as a “puppet for foreign
interests” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.240). Rebel leaders began preaching that ‘“the only
way to end the calamities torturing our country is to overthrow the despotic rule of Ydígoras and
set up a government which proves by deeds that it is worthy of the people’s trust”’ (Schlesinger
and Kinzer, 2005, p.241). Three opposition parties, the Christian Democrats, the Revolutionary
Party and the MLN, jointly demanded that Ydígoras resign. Student demonstrators began to take
to the streets in protest in which nearly 20 died and 200 were injured within two days. The U.S.
became alarmed due to the growing public support towards the overthrow of Ydígoras. President
John F. Kennedy approved a “pacification program” aimed at the rebellious provinces of Zacapa
and Izabal. With American help, Ydígoras was able to defeat the revolt. They killed and jailed
hundreds of students, labor leaders, peasants, professionals and ex-soldiers (Schlesinger and
Kinzer, 2005). The Catholic Church even came out against Ydígoras, arguing that he has allowed
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for peasants to receive ‘“salaries that hardly permit them to avoid death by starvation”’ and
permitting plantation workers to live “in situations closely resembling concentration
camps” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.242). Ydígoras’ relationship with the U.S. began to
deteriorate, until Juan José Arévalo “who led Guatemala from dictatorship to democracy in the
1940s” declared on November 26, 1962 that he was running for the presidency (Schlesinger and
Kinzer, 2005, p.243). The U.S. was displeased by this development, especially given the fact that
Ydígoras said he would let Arévalo return from Mexico to run for president. In order to keep
Arévalo from becoming president and getting rid of the weak Ydígoras, another coup occurred.
An American journalist disclosed that President Kennedy “chaired a secret meeting in early
January 1963 which authorized a coup against Ydígoras” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.243).
Ydígoras awoke with an American made tank parked on his front lawn and was forced to
surrender his power to Minister of Defense Enrique Peralta Azurdia, the U.S. approved
successor.
General Peralta Azurdia abandoned nearly all efforts to assist the many impoverished
people in Guatemala and instead chose to militarize the country even further. He trained army
squads to track and kill guerillas. Unlike Ydígoras, Peralta Azurdia turned down the assistance of
Special Forces “Green Beret '' troops, despite the relentless insisting by the U.S. Additionally, he
promised to bring back elections in 1966. Liberals and anti-military activists rallied behind the
centrist politician, Mario Méndez Montenegro. Four months before the election, Mario Méndez
Montenegro was found dead in his home. Authorities declared it as a suicide, but that has been
widely debated. He was replaced by his brother, Julio César Méndez Montenegro, who won the
election. The military quickly tried to oust him, but backed down under American pressure. But,
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eventually the Guatemalan army was able to force the weak and frightened Méndez Montenegro
into giving them greater control. This worked in the favor of the U.S. because the change in
power made it possible for Americans to implement the U.S. Green Beret soldiers in Guatemala.
The U.S. provided $6 million in aid to Guatemalan armed forces under the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) along with $11 million in American military equipment. Under the presidency
of Méndez Montenegro and the involvement of the Green Beret soldiers, thousands of people
were killed, few being actual guerrillas. Political assasination on a mass scale became the new
norm in Guatemala. The majority of those killed were middle-class professionals that supported
Arévalo and Arbenz (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). Four months after Méndez Montenegro
took office, the New York Times reported that “the United States had now finally found a “willing
partner” in Guatemala.” According to Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1966 was the year that marked the
beginning of “ferocious warfare in Guatemala” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.247). In
September 1967, Clemente Marroquín Rojas, vice president under Méndez Montenegro, was
interviewed by a reporter. In this interview he revealed that a “squadron of United States aircraft
piloted by U.S. personnel had flown from bases in Panama, delivered loads of napalm on targets
suspected of being guerrilla haunts, and flown back to their bases without landing on
Guatemalan soil” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.247). Additionally, United States Special
Forces were leading intensive training of local personnel in anti-guerrilla warfare, interrogation
of prisoners and jungle survival (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). The U.S. was also providing
assistance to the Guatemalan national police force, allocating more than $2.6 million from 1966
to 1970 for police instruction and equipment (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). The U.S. helped
increase the Guatemalan police force from 3,000 to 11,000 men.
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Right wing terror squads were running rampant throughout Guatemala. They killed the
beauty queen and former Miss Guatemala, Rogelia Cruz Martínez, for her anti-government
views. In reaction to this, leftist guerrillas decided to attack the United States military, claiming
they were “responsible for the surge of savagery in their country” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005,
p.248). They killed Lieutenants and American ambassadors. The following years included further
extermination strategies for the opposition and increasingly dictatorial leadership. Murders and
disappearances reached unprecedented levels, as the U.S. continued to support and fund the
Guatemalan government. In 1970, a large oil reserve was found in Guatemala, which provided
10 percent of the annual needs of the U.S.
By the 1980s, the 14,00 member Guatemalan armed forces had become increasingly
wealthy. It had its own bank, ran investment funds for its members, and launched industrial
projects. Schlesinger and Kinzer explain that military leaders had a goal of essentially destroying
the political center. They labelled anyone that did not support the regime as a leftist and therefore
an enemy.
As right wing terror squads were raiding the mountains of Guatemala, killing innocent
civilians, more guerrilla groups began to pop up. The main groups being the Guerrilla Army of
the Poor (EGP), Rebel Armed Forces, (FAR) the PGT a militant wing of the Communist party
and the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA). According to Schlesinger
and Kinzer, the guerrillas traced their lineage directly to Operation Success. The quality of life
for Guatemalans during the 1980s was nowhere near the level of the Arbenz-Arévalo years. The
World Bank released a 1978 report stating that 10 percent of Guatemalan landowners owned
more than 80 percent of the land. In rural areas, 15 percent of people had access to piped water,
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four percent had access to electricity. One third of the rural population was undernourished.
Guatemalans were increasingly dying not only from the bullets and bombings of war, but from
the scarcity of medical care and from malnutrition. 83 of every 1,000 children born did not
survive the first two years of life. The violent 1954 coup was a “forcible interruption of the
Guatemalan political process” (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005). The coup, according to
Schlesinger and Kinzer, showed other countries that the U.S. was more interested in allies who
didn't ask questions rather than democratic ones. Peaceful reform was put on hold as dictators
were built up and encouraged by the influx of U.S. military aid. Activists saw no possibility of
producing change through elections, so they turned to guerrilla warfare.
Gender-based Violence pre and during Civil War
According to Carey and Tores, the femicide we see in Guatemala today is a result of the
“systemic impunity” that was cemented during the Civil War in which terror forced a social
acceptance of mass murder. They argue that femicide has become further accepted as the postwar
peace process leaves the violence unresolved. The Civil War, also known as La Violencia (the
violence) normalized violence and rape, with many experts arguing that it was the origin for
femicide and Guatemala’s complicity in it (Carey and Tores, 2010). During the civil war, the
military and other security forces committed 99 percent of the sexual crimes against women, but
have never been brought to trial. Carey and Tores argue that we cannot pin the Civil War as the
sole reason that a femicide exists today, we have to recognize the historical trend of violence
against women in Guatemala. Under the dictatorships of Manuel Estrada Cabrera (1898–1920)
and General Jorge Ubico (1931–1944), who the U.S. supported, women were consistenly victims
of whippings, beatings, rape and muder. Douglas Hay (1992) argues that “state violence and
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private violence are reciprocal and reinforcing” (Carey and Tores, 2010). Men assumed
ownership over women’s bodies and the dictators reinforced “gendered terror” through their
indifference toward sexual aggression. Gendered terror provides “an outlet for male frustrations
that did not challenge the state and perpetuated a sense of fear and intimidation that regimes used
to keep people in line” (Carey and Tores, 2010). Women were expected to be “docile producers
and reproducers'' and if they weren’t they could be beaten (Carey and Tores, 2010). This was
reinforced by a judicial system that did not act upon the violence against women, but instead let
men get away with very short sentences or no time served at all. Another important historical
factor to mention is that it was customary law in Mayan communities that men have a right to hit
their wives and children. Women were “outlets for male aggression” and a way in which to
maintain the patriarchy (Carey and Tores, 2010). If women used violence, they were seen as
immoral or ‘“savage cave-dwellers” who “drank the blood” of their antagonists”’ they were
made to be inhuman (Carey and Tores, 2010). Violence was to only be accepted if it were done
by a man, and that is certainly a factor in the current femicide in Guatemala. Even though
Arévalo and Arbenz spoke of social equality and justice, sexual violence was still very prominent
under their administrations. Forster (1999) explains that ‘“a pervasive acceptability of hateful
acts toward women seeped into work, politics, and economic change”’ (quoted in Carey and
Tores, 2010)
During La Violencia, Guatemalan armed forces practiced their counterinsurgency through
previously established gender roles. They would display images of Ladino female guerrillas that
did not follow the typical gender norms in public service ads and publish cadaver reports in the
newspapers. In these ads, the point was to show that women were so naive and they required
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guidance, otherwise they would be drawn in by Marxist ideologies. These ads made women
become a threat, their main roles were teachers and caregivers, therefore they could manipulate
the minds of susceptible youth. The ads were suggesting to the (male) public that women needed
to be tamed and controlled. Carey and Tores argue that once women became associated with
being a threat to society, they became dispensable and thus were warranted victims of state
sponsored violence. This was a way in which violence against women became normalized and
justified, underpinning the femicide we see today (Carey and Tores, 2010). These
counterinsurgency ads emphasized that anti female behavior, communism or gang involvement
today were a justification for social cleansing. Since society accepted that it was a public
violation for women to transgress gender norms, society also has condoned the violation of any
citizen that transgresses (Carey and Tores, 2010).
The violence women faced, particularly Mayan women, is gut wrenching. Through
interviews, Mayan refugee women explained how they were witnesses to countless rapes, public
eviscerations of pregnant women, the burnings of alive persons in places of worship and public
decapitations. Often, the bodies of the victims would be hung for everyone to see, which Carey
and Tores argue “is evidence of the armed forces’ public defilement of life, and particularly
indigenous life, during La Violencia.” Before mass assassinations, women were raped in front of
loved ones and community members, with 90 percent of all these rape victims being Mayan
women (Carey and Tores, 2010). There was dramatic underreporting from the newspapers of the
mass murders during the civil war, which can be seen as an acceptance of the murder of Maya.
Rape became a tool used for torture because of the way in which it can shame and violate both a
woman’s character and body. Parastate forces would also deface the bodies to make sure that the
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viewer’s attention would be towards the acts of torture. According to Sylvanna Falcon this is
known as “national security rape”and “is a result of the hypermasculinization of a militarized
environment in which rape becomes a tool to shame women and men” (Carey and Tores, 2010).
Conditions Open for Drug Trafficking
In December of 1996, Guatemala began to emerge from their 36 year long civil war with
the signing of peace accords between the umbrella guerilla organization Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and the government. The peace accords were meant to cut the
military and reform and rebuild a civilian police force. The military was cut from 44,000 soldiers
in 1997 to 16,000 in 2009. According to Espach et al., establishing an effective national police
force was met by many obstacles including no political commitment, a lack of consensus among
elites and human rights groups and inconsistency in administration. In the early 2000s, it was
clear that Guatemala, a country with over 1,000 miles of border and coastline and nearly 14
millions citizens had “no persistent, effective police or security presence in control in the
majority of its territory” (Espach, et al. 2011). With the combination of a crippled economy and
little fear of government interference, drug trafficking began to thrive throughout Guatemala.
The war created conditions in which people were constantly fearing for their lives. An
estimated 500,000 to 1.5 million civilians left the country, many to the U.S. (Ewing, 2018). For
those that left to the U.S. many settled in Los Angeles and became involved in the extensive
gang networks there. California adopted a law that required “the deportation of foreign criminals
sentenced to more than a year in jail” (Ewing, 2018). One of the main issues for Guatemala was
that policy specified that the crimes committed in the U.S. would not be shared with the country
the criminal was being deported to (Ewing, 2018). Guatemala had no idea the type of criminals
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that were being sent back to their country and therefore could not implement any policy to deter
this type of crime. Deportations continued to rise in the U.S. and by 1996, nearly 3,600 gang
members were being deported to Guatemala every year (Ewing, 2018). Historically, Guatemala
had never had a gang presence within the country, but with the increase in deportations from the
U.S., gang membership began to rise. According to Ewing, Guatemalan gangs mainly targeted
youth who had very few options other than to join due to the fragmented state that “provided
very minimal security support, minimal education and few prospects of employment in the years
following the war.” The Civil War left Guatemala filled with weapons and a population of
uneducated young men with “few marketable skills other than the ability to handle a
gun” (Brands, 2011).
Kurtenbach argues that the war had extreme consequences for youth socialization and
transitions to adulthood. Families and primary social networks were torn apart by the war due to
mass migration, displacement and violence. These young people during the war had no sense of
stable social relations (Kurtenbach, 2012). In the second half of the war, nearly 50 percent of
refugees consisted of children and adolescents and between 100,000 and 500,000 children
became orphaned (Kurtenbach, 2012). Schooling was also greatly affected, public resources
were being spent on the war instead of on education. There was a significant focus on recruiting
children into the armed forces and paramilitary organizations. In 1995, 35 percent of
Guatemala’s fifteen year olds were classified as illiterate, and 44.5 percent had only three years
of schooling. Youth gangs were seen as a welcoming and safe space in which they felt a sense of
solidarity and belonging. According to Kurtenbach, youth violence in Guatemala is a result of the
dysfunctional families and a failed school-to-work transition.
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In Guatemala today, very few people that are responsible for the violence and homicides
are brought to justice. The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) (an
independent international organization that stemmed from the request by Guatemala for help
from the UN after the peace accords and a rise in illegal armed groups) (Schneider, 2019)
reported in 2006 that 95% of murders were never solved(Ewing, 2018). In 2019, former
President Jimmy Morales decided to shut down the CICIG. Morales’ decision to not renew the
CICIG resulted in domestic and international outcry. They are responsible for prosecuting serious
crimes, combating illegal armed criminal networks and overall supporting the rule of law.
According to Breda, in September of 2018, the CICIG donors’ group aka the G13, released a
joint statement expressing regret over the government’s decision, but the U.S. did not sign. Breda
explains that this choice of the U.S. was a product of an “effective influence campaign” to turn
U.S. politicians against the commission through intense lobbying in Washington by Guatemalan
business figures and politicians (Breda, 2019). They used unproven allegations that “Moscow
had penetrated the commission's 2015 invesitgations against the Bitkov family” that fled to
Guatemala due to Russian persecution (Breda, 2019). They were accused of securing residency
papers through corrupt means. This greatly helped the campaign against the CICIG with the U.S.
Congress. Not only that, but President Morales gained favour from the Trump Administration by
moving the Guatemalan embassy in Israel to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv in February 2018 (Breda,
2019). The U.S. had the opportunity to place pressure on reinstating the CICIG, but instead the
Trump Administration looked the other way as Guatemala moved their embassy in Israel. The
U.S. was one of the commission’s main donors giving nearly $45 million in contributions, but
rather than stand with the others in the public outcry, they “chose not to push back” (Breda,
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2019). According to a recent CICIG report, criminal networks have already begun reviving
techniques for obstructing judicial investigations (Breda, 2019). A spike in impunity rates has
been the result, rising to 94.2 percent for homicide cases in 2018 (Breda, 2019). Even though this
is public data that the U.S. is aware of, there is no action from the current administration to
support the reinstatement of the CICIG. According to Breda, he predicts that with the exit of
CICIG, high level officials and politicians will take advantage of weaker oversight and return to
“patterns of corruption and state collusion with drug trafficking and other criminal organisations
that multiple CICIG cases uncovered” (Breda, 2019).
Currently, the Guatemalan government has been unable to suppress criminal activity,
which has led to Guatemalans becoming very skeptical as to whether or not the current system
can provide them with “basic human security” (Brands, 2011). For instance, in 2005, indigenous
Guatemalans that faced genocide during the Civil War, refused help from the army after
disastrous floods and mudslides (Brands, 2011). Due to persistent violence and corruption, there
is a significant amount of distrust in the government. According to a study done by USAID, 86%
of Guatemalans surveyed said they felt that “the level of insecurity facing Guatemala presents a
threat to the future well-being of the country” and 45% said that “insecurity poses a threat to
their own personal security” (Brands, 2011). There is very little confidence that the government
can protect its citizens and extinguish the rampant violence the country faces. Today, this
sentiment is expressed even more due to the dismantling of CICIG. Instead, there has been a rise
in a trend known as “social cleansing” in which local vigilantes are taking the violence and
corruption into their own hands. According to Kurtenbach, the increasing levels of violence we
see in Guatemala is a result of state repression and zero tolerance strategies that criminalize
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gangs and also marginalized youth. This in turn had led to an increase in gang members rarely
being jailed, but rather “preferred victims” of the vigilantes.
Human Trafficking in Guatemala
According to David Jr. Carey and Garbriella Tores (2010), women in Guatemala today,
are killed at similar rates as the 1980s during the genocidal Civil War. More than five thousand
women and girls have been brutally murdered in Guatemala since 2000. Bodies cover the streets,
ravines and the media. Carey and Tores explain that “images of murdered women and girls are so
commonplace that each new death risks becoming a footnote to illustrate a rising death toll.”
They have labeled this as a femicide epidemic that is a reflection of the normalization of violence
against women in Guatemala (Tores & Carey, 2010). This normalization of violence against
women took place during the Civil War to support the patriarchy and maintain dictatorships and
democracies. Today, it is clear that Guatemala has an engrained macho culture where men need
to be tough and aggressive leaders. This along with extensive sexual abuse within the home, are
some of the biggest drivers of trafficking (Moloney, 2016). Often, human trafficking begins with
domestic and sexual violence by fathers and stepfathers, a common situation in Guatemala
(Moloney, 2016). This type of violence leads children to run away from home and typically
become victim to sexual exploitation by traffickers. Gender-based violence became femicide
when peacetime governments like Arbenz, became too weak to control paramilitary powers
(Tores & Carey, 2010). The findings of Tores and Carey are connected with the research of
Louise Shelley (2010). Shelley presents persuading arguments regarding the connection between
human trafficking and civil war. Though Shelley is not specifically looking at Guatemala, the
same arguments can be applied. In her research she argues that clear links are evident between
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conflict regions and labor trafficking. She specifically looks at trafficked laborers in Uzbek,
Kyrgyz, and Tajik, all countries that have had civil wars or conflict (Shelley, 2010). She
continues to explain that a generation of Tajiks were deprived of education and had no possibility
of employment in their country, similar to the case of Guatemala after the Civil War. Poverty is
one of the main drivers for sex trafficking in Guatemala, three in five people live on less than
$3.10 a day (Moloney, 2016). This implies that sex trafficking should be seen in all poor
countries, but that is not the case. Sex trafficking arises out of wartime and post-wartime
societies in which populations are vulnerable and face an increased risk for trafficking and
exploitation. Traffickers “exploit this tragic humanitarian situation to target refugees, forced
migrants and internally displaced persons”(Catholic News Service, 2017). Traffickers are
targeting poor, uneducated and unemployed women, providing them with false promises of
earning money from modelling or waitressing (Moloney, 2016). Shelley also argues that the rise
of conflict in Afghanistan has exasperated sexual and labor trafficking between Tajikistan and
Afghanistan (Shelley, 2010). She goes on to describe how in Nigeria, after the civil war in the
late 1960s, major organized crime groups began to develop vastly throughout West Africa. A
similar situation occurred in Guatemala as gang participation surrounding drug trafficking
increased.
Throughout Guatemala, criminal organizations took advantage of the institutions
weakened by the Civil War, along with the rampant poverty and social alienation that left many
with no other choice than to become involved in criminal activity. According to Brands, “drug
traffickers, youth gangs, and organized crime syndicates generally lack the coherent ideological
or political program often associated with an insurgency” yet they have still managed to weaken
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the state and establish dominance over many parts of the population. They aim to not overthrow
the established government, but instead to “take control of a city, one neighborhood-or even one
block- at a time” (Brands, 2011). Essentially they are working to corrode the authority of the
state, yet still use the government to their advantage through hefty payoffs. In 2007, then- Vice
President Eduadro Stein stated that “criminal elements” controlled six out of 22 Guatemala
departments. Nearly $1 billion of drug money making its way through Guatemala is used to bribe
government officials (Brands, 2011). Cartels also pay small-town mayors in order to set up
airstrips, they bribe judges, police, military officials and border guards in order to avoid
government surveillance and prosecution. According to Brands, when plata (money) cannot
persuade the authorities, then plomo (lead) “is used to batter them into submission.”
Essentially, these criminal organizations are making it so that state authority has no control over
their operations. They have been able to build their own infrastructure through the accumulation
of control over various cities and towns especially along the border, and have moved into human
trafficking operations. Violent youth gangs represent the third major criminal group present in
Guatemala. The Maras are larger, more sophisticated groups that have tens or even thousands of
members throughout multiple countries. They use their international connections to smuggle
arms as well as participate in human trafficking. They have strong connections in Mexico as well
as the U.S. where tens of thousands of members across more than 40 states exist (Brands, 2011).
According to a USAID official, most of the mareros are victims of poverty, violence, unstable
family life and are uneducated, “They have no realistic hope of getting anywhere in the modern
world” (Brands, 2011).
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Throughout the Northern Triangle, it is estimated that “30,000 people in Honduras,
47,000 in Guatemala, and 16,000 in El Salvador are living in conditions of enslavement as
defined within the traditional framework of human trafficking” (Boerman and Golob, 2020).
There has been some effort from the Guatemalan government over the years to combat human
trafficking, including in 2009 the passing of La Ley Contra la Violencia Sexual, Explotación y
Trata de Personas (The Law Against Sexual Violence, Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons).
The main objective of this was to “...prevent, repress, punish and eradicate sexual violence, the
exploitation and trafficking of persons, the care and protection of their victims and to compensate
for the damages caused” (Congress, Guatemala, 2009). As we can see from current statistics, this
goal has not been achieved. Recently, Guatemala released its 2018-2022 National AntiTrafficking Plan. This plan urges for increased investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases,
increased victim services, improving access to the Mayan community and greater outreach
outside of Guatemala City (Boerman and Golob, 2020).
According to the 2018 Trafficking in Persons Report, the Guatemalan government didn’t
demonstrate increased efforts to prevent or prosecute cases. The previous reporting period shows
that the government did not increase efforts to protect victims, in fact they decreased protection
efforts by identifying only 371 victims in 2018 and 316 in 2017, compared to 484 in 2016 and
673 in 2015 (Boerman and Golob, 2020). According to the 2019 Trafficking in Persons Report,
the government prosecuted and convicted fewer traffickers and they “did not address underlying
problems in the nation’s shelters providing for child trafficking victims; referred only 64 percent
of victims to care, and specialized victim services remained inadequate.” Based on the report,
corruption and complicity remain significant concerns. According to the U.S. State Department
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in Guatemala, criminal organizations such as gangs, are exploiting girls in sex trafficking and
coercing young males in urban areas to sell and transport drugs or commit extortion (Boerman
and Golob, 2020). In 2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) explained that
when children and women are recruited via force into gangs, they become “locked into
dangerous, exploitative and dehumanizing situations” where leaving is not an option (Boerman
and Golob, 2020). According to Boerman and Golob, children and youth are at even higher risk
for being coerced into gangs due to a lack of protective adult presence, especially a male
presence. As discussed earlier, one of the main results of the war was mass migration and
displacement in which between 100,000 and 500,000 children became orphaned (Kurtenbach,
2012). The 2019 report states that foreign child sex tourists, coming from mainly Canada, the
U.S. and Western Europe as well as Guatemalan men “patronize child sex trafficking victims for
commercial sex acts” (Department of State, 2019). Traffickers continue to exploit Guatemalan
men, women and children in forced labor within the agriculture and domestic service industries
in Mexico, and the U.S. Indigenous Guatemalans, including children are especially vulnerable to
forced labor and exploitation. Children are exploited regularly by traffickers, being forced into
begging and street vending. Criminal organizations such as gangs, are exploiting girls in sex
trafficking and coercing young males in urban areas to sell and transport drugs or commit
extortion (Department of State, 2019). Additionally, police, military, and elected officials were
placed under investigation for paying children for sex acts, facilitating sex trafficking and
protecting sex trafficking venues (Department of State, 2019).
According to Boerman and Golob, Northern Triangle countries are male dominated
societies “in which an exceedingly high percentage of child, adolescent and adult females are
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subjected to the psychologically, physically and sexually coercive and violent behavior of males”
that act with impunity. Boerman and Golob explain that gang members tend to be the “most
hyper-masculinized of the hyper-masculinized” and the most violent. The situation in Guatemala
today is a replica of the normalized violence during the Civil War. They see women as “their
women” essentially their property. Gang members risk beatings if they allow women to openly
defy them. Gangs use terror strategies as a way in which they are able to establish control over
territories, criminal markets and the population. Similar to during La Violencia, Boerman and
Golob refer to a recent study that showed gang members are still raping and torturing girls and
leaving their mutilated and dismembered bodies in public. In doing this, they are demonstrating
their dominance and instilling fear in the community (Boerman and Golob, 2020). In one of
Boerman and Golob’s interviews an anonymous UN Representative stated that “For girls in
gang-controlled areas, reaching sexual maturity is a risk factor” (Boerman and Golob, 2020).
One of the risks is being agarrada (grabbed), in which a young girl is abducted and subjected to
sexual violence and then most likely disappeared or murdered. Another risk is being a gang
leader or member’s Jaina which “is often misinterpreted as synonymous with
“girlfriend”’ (Boerman and Golob, 2020). Once a girl is made a Jaina, or targeted as one, they are
then considered property of the gang in which the gang has complete control over every aspect of
their life and are usually coerced into criminal activity (Boerman and Golob, 2020). In another
one of Boerman and Golob’s interviews with a UN Special Rapporteur, he found that ‘“The most
common form of extreme extortion of sexual and other services described by the interlocutors
involves forcing them (young females) to provide sexual services to gang members in
prisons”’(Boerman and Golob, 2020). Women and their families are threatened with violence or
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death in order to make them comply. These women have no way out. There is significant fear
associated with reporting gang related sexual and gender based violence, along with the idea that
reporting is useless given that gangs are known for paying off cops. Therefore, the majority of
victims do not seek assistance.
Brands explains that in order to defend against the increasing criminal networks in
Guatemala, the government needs to synchronize police and military programs as well as work
towards social reform, institution building and economic development. But, one of the many
problems facing the government is that historically the Guatemalan government has turned
against its citizens, so there is significant distrust and resistance in allowing the military into
domestic security matters, even though the police are overwhelmed. As a result of the Civil War,
poverty and an influx of gang violence, as well as heightened gender based violence are working
together in order to make crime attractive to Guatemalan youth. The vast corruption and weak
government continue to undermine any countermeasures the Guatemalan government introduces,
and thus poses a significant hurdle for an effective response to the rampant human trafficking
crippling Guatemala. Additionally, starting in the 1960s, “the experience of fighting the violent
left led to the formation of tight-knit military fraternities among officers who rose the ranks
together” (Brands, 2011). The war resulted in the rise of a corrupt military elite that “used their
influence and connections to snap up the best arable land, acquire favorable positions in mining
and industry, divert government funds for their personal use, and engage in the drug trade and
other illicit activities” (Brands, 2011). Until the government and drug cartels cut their ties, it is
challenging to see a future in which human trafficking decreases in Guatemala.
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Immigration Today-An Implication of the War
Guatemalan migrants making their way to the U.S. border in hopes of a better and safer
life face obstacles every step of the way. Their journey to the border is often a tumultuous and
dangerous one, with relief rarely being found after stepping foot on U.S. soil. Often, they are met
with family separation, third country agreements, deportation and long detention periods.
Additionally, they face racist, anti-immigrant rhetoric. When discussing immigration, it is
important to recognize the push and pull factors that drive people to immigrate. For the case of
Guatemala, the push factors consist of femicide, human and drug trafficking and an overall
unstable and dangerous environment. The pull factors urging Guatemalans to migrate to the U.S.
are hopes for a more stable and safe life. Not only that, but in the U.S. there is a built in demand
for unskilled labor that often drives immigrants to migrate.
Large scale immigration to the U.S from Guatemala is one of the main implications of the
Civil War. The number of Guatemalans that migrated to the U.S. both legally and unauthorized
during the war rose from 13,785 in 1977 to 45,917 in 1989 (Jonas, 2013). The majority of those
seeking refuge in the U.S. were indigenous Maya and ladino (mixed) as they were the main
victims of the war. During the late 1970s, in which the war was focused in the western Mayan
highlands, the first large-scale migration began consisting of mainly Mayan refugees. Thousands
ended up in United Nations refugee camps in southern Mexico. Some of the displaced went to
the United States to seek asylum from political or ethnic persecution, but were not granted
refugee status in Mexico or the U.S. According to the Guatemalan Army’s reports, their
operation destroyed 440 highland villages from 1981-1983. Nearly 150,00 (primarily highland
Mayas) were killed or disappeared in the early 1980s with 200,000 being the total from
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1954-1996. 1 million Mayan villagers were internally displaced, and nearly 200,000 fled to
southern Mexico with 46,000 going to the camps and the other 75 percent outside the camps
(Jonas, 2013). Even though Mayan and ladinos were clearly being persecuted by their
government, they were still denied refugee status. According to the 1951 U.N. Convention,
which is “the centrepiece of international refugee protection today” a refugee is someone that is
“unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion” (UNHCR, 2007). The U.S. signed onto the U.N. refugee protocol in 1967. Not
only did the U.S. place Guatemala on a trajectory towards violence, they continued to neglect the
problems they helped create in Guatemala by denying asylum applications. In 1984, “only 3% of
asylum applications were approved for Guatemalans and Salvadorans, compared with 40 percent
for Afghans fleeing the Soviet invasion and 100 percent for Cuban asylum seekers” (The Week,
2019). Despite a genocidal civil war occuring in Guatemala, that the U.S. had direct knowledge
of and assisted in, they still refused to help. René de León Schlotter, a leader of Guatemala’s
center left Christian Democrats, made a statement in front of the United States Congress in 1976
illuminating the reasons as to why the U.S. needs to be held accountable and share the
responsibility in what Guatemala had become:
The responsibility of the United States, although indirect, is very real and serious.
With its policy of supporting dictatorships, the United States has collaborated in
the strengthening of these regimes and burdened our people with debts, often for
the most superfluous programs. With its policy of military and police assistance,
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the United States has collaborated in the acts of repression, and consequently in
the violation of human rights (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 2005, p.250).
Migration continues in this post war era due to the “severe socio economic problems,
successive natural disasters, increasing social violence- and weak state, lacking the vision,
capacity, and resources to resolve these problems internally” (Jonas. 2013). Additionally, several
environmental disasters have occurred in Guatemala since the 1990s including two hurricanes
and an earthquake. Yet, following these disasters, Guatemalans have never been granted
Temporary Protected Status in the United States, despite Salvadorans, Hondurans and
Nicaraguans receiving this relief. Guatemala today is still feeling the effects of the Civil War that
the U.S. helped fund. They have widespread femicide, little economic opportunity and overall
rampant gang violence. These are the main contributors as to why we see such significant
numbers of Guatemalans trying to migrate to the U.S. So why are Guatemalans being denied at
the U.S. border when we played such a significant role in the country’s demise?
Currently, there is a backlog of more than 900,000 immigration court cases which in turn
has resulted in very overwhelmed detention facilities under Trump’s zero tolerance policy. The
Trump Administration has taken the neoclassical economic approach to deter asylum seekers.
The Trump Administration has chosen to raise the costs of seeking asylum and lower the benefits
through actions like family separation and forcing asylum seekers to wait in Mexico for their
court date. This is part of Trump’s Wait in Mexico Procedure, officially known as Migrant
Protection Protocols, which is also related to the new “Last-in first out” process for accepting
refugee/asylee applications. This means that recently filed asylum applications will be prioritized
over those that have been pending for years. According to the Trump Administration, the years-
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long waiting period encourages fraudulent claims. Previously, if someone received a “positive
determination” in their credible fear interview they would be given a Notice to Appear (NTA)
and a hearing date with an immigration judge. Also, the asylum seeker could be eligible for an
immigration bond, allowing for their release into the U.S. while their case was pending in court
(Blake, 2019). This Wait in Mexico Procedure was unveiled by former Secretary of Homeland
Security, Kirstjen Nielsen in an effort to “curtail the so-called catch-and release system, in which
individuals make fraudulent asylum claims knowing they will be allowed into the United States
and be able to stay for years before their court appearance, which many do not show up
for” (Blake, 2019). With this procedure, the credible fear interview is no longer occurring and
asylum seekers are sent to Mexico with a NTA. Once they arrive in Mexico, they are then given
a humanitarian visa by the Mexican government which is valid for a year. They are told to return
to a port of entry within 45 days for a hearing with a U.S. immigration judge (Blake, 2019). One
of the main challenges that asylum seekers face when sent to Mexico is being able to acquire
legal counsel. According to Blake, it is typically unlikely that asylum seekers will find U.S.
attorneys “to take on and adequately prepare their cases.” Additionally, 80 percent of the 60,000
people forced to remain in Mexico “are regularly targeted for abduction and other acts of severe
violence” (Blake, 2019). This last-in first out policy severely disadvantages asylum seekers that
have already been waiting in the backlog. They now risk being sent back to violent and life
threatening conditions ‘“because their cases will be further delayed and they will have even more
difficulty getting witnesses and evidence to support their claims”’(Torbati, 2018). Some
immigration lawyers even argue these changes have “made it harder to assemble documentation
on short notice for applicants whose cases get fast-tracked” (Villagomez, 2018). If lawyers
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cannot collect enough evidence in time, their clients will not be granted asylum (Villagomez,
2018).
In fiscal year 2019, Customs and Border Patrol encountered over 977,509 people
attempting to cross the southwest border. Most of these people are coming from Guatemala,
Honduras and El Salvador in an effort to flee the rampant crime, violence and corruption
occurring in these countries. Travel warnings have been issued by the U.S. to all of these
countries, yet the Trump Administration is still trying to send asylum seekers there. The Trump
Administration issued a “sweeping rule in July that prevents migrants from being granted asylum
if they passed through any country other than their own before arriving in the U.S.” (Narea,
2019). The Administration made agreements with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras that
migrants must apply for protections in these countries first, before they can come to the U.S.
even though most asylum seekers today are from these countries. This has been framed “as a way
to help these countries develop their asylum systems” which includes a $47 million pledge to
Guatemala (Narea, 2019). President Morales signed onto the Trump Administration “Safe Third
Country Agreement” in July of 2019. Once again, political leaders in Guatemala are playing right
into the hand of the U.S. and not advocating for their most vulnerable citizens. A country in
which over 250,000 of its citizens have tried to flee and were apprehended at the U.S. border
since October 2018 (Semple, 2019). There is widespread opposition to the agreement within
Guatemala. The Constitutional Court ruled that the Guatemalan government needed
congressional approval to make this agreement with the U.S. This decision occurred during the
negotiations between former President Morales and the Trump Administration leading President
Trump to threaten Guatemala with tariffs, a travel ban and taxes on remittances sent home by
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Guatemalan migrants in the U.S. (Semple, 2019). Guatemala does not have the infrastructure to
support vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers when they can hardly protect their own citizens,
yet that is not stopping the Trump Administration or former President Morales from trying to
make this deal work. Current President Alejandro Giammattei was not as keen towards the “Safe
Third Country Agreement,” but ended up backing it as well. If he had not signed the agreement,
Trump threatened to withhold all development aid for Guatemala.
Alternative Explanations
Some may argue that Guatemala was already on a path to civil unrest regardless of U.S.
intervention, explaining that there is an ingrained machismo culture existing in Guatemala. Carey
and Tores argue that the Civil War is not the only reason that a femicide exists in Guatemala
today, but that we also need to recognize that there is a historical trend of violence against
women in Guatemala. Some argue that women are seen as subordinate to men within society and
that this weak female role is the reason as to why we see increasing femicide within Guatemala
today. According to Golob, “This machismo phenomenon fosters a mindset of male domination,
which can often lead to mistreatment of women and children at the hands of men.” Jackson
argues that machismo culture has created a society in Guatemala that sees women as lesser
beings causing their deaths to be overlooked. He continues to argue that old cultural norms must
be tackled if Guatemala wants to create a society that cares for and protects women. Yet, there
are many other machismo cultures that exist and do not experience rampant human trafficking or
femicide. For example, Spain has a machismo culture and also experienced a brutal dictatorship
and civil war, yet they are a tier 1 country for human trafficking. The government of Spain fully
meets the standards for eliminating human trafficking and are improving each year in their
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efforts to lessen its existence in their country. One may argue that there are substantial
differences in the level of economic development between Spain and Guatemala, which is
certainly true. But, the financial distress Guatemala is experiencing is yet another implication of
the vast involvement of the U.S. in Guatemala’s government and Civil War. Guatemala is
experiencing these issues as a result of the U.S. engineering the overthrow of democratically
elected Jacobo Arbenz and replacing him with a long line of violent dictators that the U.S. also
supported through funding, weapons and training. This normalization of gendered violence and
rape occurred during the 36 year long Civil War. According to Sylvanna Falcon, rape is a weapon
of war, it is also known as “national security rape” and is a result of hypermasculinization of a
militarized environment (Carey and Tores, 2010). Falcon also argues that “rape and sexual
assualt are rationalized in wartime due to the construction of the (racialized) enemy” which in
the case of Guatemala was mainly guerillas and women, particularly indigenous women (Falcon,
2001). This normalization of violence occurred during the Civil War in order to uphold the
patriarchy while maintaining dictatorships and democracies (Tores & Carey, 2010). This mindset
has carried over into postwar Guatemala as gangs continue to attempt to take control of the
government and local authorities through hefty payoffs and scare tactics. Using violence as a
weapon against women and seeing their bodies hanging in the streets became increasingly
normalized during the war to the point that we still see it occurring today. The femicide occurring
in Guatemala today is a direct reflection of the normalization of violence towards women during
the war. The terror during the Civil War forced a social acceptance of mass murder.
Another explanation as to why Guatemala was already on a path towards demise is the
historical wrongful treatment of indigenous peoples in Guatemala, particularly the Mayas.
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Before the war, Mayas were subsistence farmers that produced staple crops such as beans and
maize. Before Arbenz was elected president, his predecessors decided to follow U.S. corporate
interests and turn the economy towards producing commodities such as coffee, sugar and
bananas for the U.S. market. Jorge Ubico allowed UFCO to own or lease three million acres of
land and operate fifteen hundred miles of railroad, much of which was indigenous land. Also,
Ubico passed vagrancy laws in which indigenous people that did not own land had to work for
local landowners at least 100 days a year. Additionally, he made it legal to “murder stubborn or
rebellious Indians” (Bucheli, 2008). The government claimed that the Mayas were Marxist
insurgents due to their resistance to the new military dictatorship after the overthrow of Jacobo
Arbenz. During the Civil War, in 1976, the Guatemala dictatorship attempted to eliminate the
Maya population through building a dam in the Rio Chixoy River where the Maya Achi lived.
The land surrounding the river was considered the most fertile in all of Guatemala. According to
Cooper (2009), Mayans that resisted the construction of the dam were “labeled as Marxist rebels
and targeted for destruction by the government’s Civil Defense Patrols.” In 1982, seventy women
and 107 children were brought from Rio Negro to Pacoxon and then raped and killed. Months
later, an additional 84 Rio Negro people were tortured and killed and 35 orphaned children were
killed in Agua Fria (Cooper, 2009). All of these murders were declared as counterinsurgency
activities by the Guatemalan government. The U.S. was aware of all of these murders and
continued to back the genocide occuring in Guatemala. According to Cooper, countering “the
U.S.-backed genocide in Guatemala, Spain, France and Sweden threw their support behind the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guerrilla movement” (Cooper, 2009). The
U.S. had the choice to end their funding of the long line of violent dictators in Guatemala, but
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instead put their own interests above the lives of hundreds of thousands of people murdered
during the war. All of this is evidence as to the repeated mistreatment of indigenous peoples in
Guatemala, but most of which was done to further U.S. interests. Arbenz wanted to help poor
indigenous farmers by supplying them with land and hope for a better future, yet that got in the
way of U.S. interest in Guatemala so he was removed.
LIMITATIONS
Initially, this paper was to solely discuss human trafficking as an indirect consequence of U.S.
involvement in Guatemala, but there was just not enough data. The U.S. did not start releasing
the Trafficking in Persons Reports until 2000, so there is no data to show what human trafficking
was like before then. One may argue that human trafficking actually did not increase because we
do not have the data to prove it. Not only that, but there is no data of human trafficking during
the war either. But, my argument is that human trafficking grew out of the expansion of gang
membership and drug trafficking. This is seen through the creation of gang networks after
Guatemalans seeking a better life in the U.S. were exposed to gang violence and deported back
to a country with little to no economic opportunity. As gangs spread throughout Guatemala and
the rest of Central America, so did human trafficking networks along with normalized gender
based violence as a result of the Civil War.
CONCLUSION
On June 27th, 1954 Jacobo Arbenz was democratically elected as president and ready to bring
social and agrarian reform to the people of Guatemala who desperately needed it. His ideas went
against the American conglomerate within Guatemala, the United Fruit Company. UFCO owned
the majority of land in Guatemala and controlled it’s railroads, wharves, shipping and telegraphs.
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Additionally, UFCO was well connected to the Eisenhower administration. When Arbenz won
the presidency, this was not to the liking of UFCO officials. Under the Ubico dictatorship, UFCO
was allowed to do whatever it pleased in Guatemala. But, as soon as Arbenz began to enforce his
plan of social agrarian reform, UFCO labeled him a communist. From the beginning, Arbenz
made it clear that he wanted Guatemala to cut ties with UFCO. He expropriated 386,901 acres
acres of uncultivated land that belonged to UFCO to poor farmers. He believed that unequal land
distribution was one of the leading causes hindering Guatemala’s economic development. He
also planned on building a highway to the Atlantic in order to end UFCO’s monopoly on
Guatemala’s foreign trade given that they owned 887 miles of railroad tracks in Guatemala
spanning across the whole country. UFCO had a stranglehold on Guatemala and Arbenz
attempted to put an end to it. But, UFCO did not go away quietly. The U.S. press began printing
stories about torture and mass arrests occurring under the Arbenz regime, claiming Guatemalans
were living in a Communist reign of terror. With the backdrop of the Cold War, the U.S. was
showing that they could defeat the Communist regime they claimed existed in Guatemala. UFCO
continued running a smear campaign against Arbenz, building up American fears which
eventually led to a CIA backed coup in 1954. After the coup, the U.S. put Castillo Armas into
power and provided him with $80 million dollars. Armas reversed everything that Arbenz was
working towards and nearly drove all the peasants that had benefited from the agrarian reform
off their new land. He, like the rest of the dictators that followed him, was very focused on
censorship and even withheld elections from taking place. But, the U.S. was invested in him.
This was the first time a “democratic” government was replacing a “communist” one and the
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U.S. had to show that Guatemala could be an example of democratic change, even though Armas
was not actually elected by the people like Arbenz was.
In 1960, the Civil War began as growing divides led to a group of armed insurgents
known as Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) starting an unsuccessful
uprising against the military regime that followed the coup. Beginning with the 1954 coup and
putting Armas in power, the U.S. laid the foundation for a long line of military dictators to take
power in Guatemala. The U.S. put hundreds of millions of dollars into the dictatorships
following the 1954 coup and during the 36 year long Civil War. They played an important role in
nearly every stage of the war. They provided them with extensive military training, weapons and
U.S. soldiers on the ground. The U.S. helped bring to power some of the worst dictators in
history, including Rios Montt whom Ronald Reagan referred to as “a man of great integrity” and
“totally dedicated to democracy” (Grandin, 2013). Montt wanted to “drain the sea” of the
guerrilla movement and largely targeted indigenous peoples. He led the “Scorched Earth”
military strategy in which more than 70,000 people died and went missing. He killed children
and elderly who could not have possibly been guerrillas. Reagan provided financial support,
military advising and lifted the U.S. embargo that Jimmy Carter had placed to pressure
Guatemala to stop the abuses. Reagan was not making these statements and assisting Montt
without knowing the human rights abuses occurring in Guatemala. He was well aware of the
large scale killings of indigenous people committed by the Guatemalan army. Instead of cutting
off funding to the Guatemalan government and admitting that those in power were leading a
genocidal war, the U.S. continued their support. They reinforced the continuation of this war and
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the demise of the country. With U.S. support, Montt continued attacking indigenous communities
and by the end of the war, nearly 200,000 people were killed and 45,000 “disappeared.”
After the Civil War, the country was in shambles. There was no economic opportunity,
but rather rampant violence for those who survived. Most had no other choice but to leave in
search of a better life. Many that fled to the U.S. after the war became involved in the gang
networks there and would end up getting deported back to Guatemala. Guatemala never had
experience with gangs, but as deportations began to rise, so did gang membership within
Guatemala. Youth were the main targets of Guatemalan gangs because they had few options
other than to join. They were mostly orphans, uneducated with very few prospects of
employment. As gang membership increased and spread throughout Guatemala and Central
America in general, so did human trafficking. With the advantage of international gang networks
throughout Central America and within the U.S. with gangs such as the Maras, human trafficking
took off. They would target poor, vulnerable girls and women with promises of economic
opportunity through careers such as modelling or waitressing. These new criminal organizations
took advantage of the weakened institutions after the Civil War along with the poverty and social
alienation that left people with no other choice than to get involved with criminal activity.
During the war, gender based violence became increasingly normalized and has carried
over into the femicide taking place in Guatemala today. The violence that women experienced,
particularly Mayan women is horrifying. They faced countless rapes, pregnant women being
eviscerated publicly, women being burnt alive and public decapitations. Their bodies would be
hung for everyone to see as evidence of the armed forces’ disregard of life, especially indigenous
life. Mayan women made up 90 percent of all rape victims during the Civil War. The judicial
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system did not act upon any of the violence that women were facing, but rather let men get away
with little to no time served at all. Most of the time, local authorities as well as the government
were being paid off, which continues to be the case today with drug and human traffickers.
Criminal organizations are continuing to exploit girls in sex trafficking at heightened numbers as
well as coercing young males to sell and transport drugs. Women and children that have been
recruited by these gangs are becoming locked into dangerous and abusive situations and are
unable to leave. This is largely a result of the state that the U.S. funded Civil War left Guatemala
in.
Guatemala still feels the effects of the Civil War today. They face a national femicide,
exceedingly high rates of human trafficking and drug trafficking, as well as an increase in
migration to the U.S. The economic hardship and violence that Guatemalans continue to face
today is once again leading them to seek refuge and a better life in the U.S. Guatemala needs to
do better in order to put an end to rising rates of human trafficking and femicide. Policies need to
be put into place and enforced. Prosecution needs to increase, people need to be held
accountable. The U.S. also needs to realize their role in the demise of Guatemala and how they
were pivotal actors that brought the country to where it is today. The problems that Arbenz was
attempting to alleviate within Guatemala are even worse now than they were before. The
Guatemalan government needs to focus on greater socio-economic opportunities and combat the
corruption that is so heavily present within local and state authorities. Educational opportunities
as well as services for victims of human trafficking and domestic violence need to be expanded.
Additionally, the U.S. needs to recognize the history behind why so many Guatemalans are
trying to enter the U.S. and loosen our immigration protocol. The Trump administration has
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painted a picture that Guatemalans trying to enter the U.S. are all violent criminals and sex
traffickers, when in reality they are just people having to flee a war torn country that the U.S.
perpetuated. Rather than just deporting Guatemalans back to an unsafe environment and cutting
aid, the U.S. government needs to realize the push factors that are sending them to the border.
The historical involvement of the U.S. in Guatemala has caused instability and inequality within
the country today. They funded a war and upheld dictators that committed countless human
rights abuses. This war led to a country in which there was nearly nothing left, no economic
opportunity, just greater gang membership, human trafficking and normalized gender based
violence that we continue to see today. Rather than accepting this and creating greater aid for
Guatemala and programs that could assist the most vulnerable such as the Maya, the current
administration continuously threatens to deny any aid at all if Guatemala does not comply with
the “Safe Third Country Agreement.” Trump is taking advantage of migrants trying to flee
Guatemala for a better life and using their futures as bargaining chips. In return for expanding the
agreement, he has set aside 10,000 H2-B temporary non-agricultural work visas for
Guatemalans, Salvadorans and Hondurans. We must do better. An apology from President
Clinton in 1999 is not enough.
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